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21. INTRODUCTION
The past decade has witnessed nothing less than an explosion in the discovery of private 
international cartels with global price-fixing ambitions.1
Cartels with international membership are not new, having been observed operating in large 
numbers both at the turn of the 19th century and in the period between the two world wars.  
What is new in the current wave of international price fixing is their global reach2.  While 
detection and prosecution of cartels with international membership offer special difficulties, 
the United States and the European Union have implemented a number of policies and 
techniques that have been moderately successful in dealing with foreign companies and 
evidence.  However, under the current regime of legal sanctions, the global aspirations of the 
new cartelists offer an insuperable challenge to a core aim of the antitrust laws -- deterrence.  
The broad geographic harm generated by the scores of global price-fixing conspiracies 
discovered since the mid 1990s has overwhelmed the ability of the world’s antitrust 
authorities and private damage actions to provide enough financial disincentives to 
discourage the formation of similar cartels in the future. 
Anticartel enforcement today is at a crossroads reminiscent of the legal situation in the 
United States in the 1880s.  The American economy was undergoing a fundamental 
transformation from a one in which markets were geographically localized to one in which 
limited liability corporations were creating trusts that operated across the Nation.  At that 
time several states had passed antitrust laws designed to correct abuses of market power of 
large scale companies with strong market positions in several states.  As state attorneys 
general soon found out, victories in state courts against railroads, meatpackers, and similar 
companies engaged in multistate collusion were hollow because effective remedies could not 
be imposed on guilty firms that had the majority of their assets located outside the state’s 
jurisdiction.  Passage of the Sherman Act was motivated in part to cure this flaw.  Today, 
many industries are led by a few multinational companies with sales spread across the 
Northern Hemisphere; each of them is in conscious rivalry for strong market positions in the 
“Triad” (North America, Western Europe, and East Asia).  When the conditions in these 
industries are right, overt but clandestine collusive conduct may occur that coordinates prices 
in the Triad and beyond.  The industrial structure of many contemporary markets has 
enervated the power of the Sherman Act in the face of such global conspiracies.  
In early 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments in a case named Empagram 
et al. v. F. Hoffmann LaRoche et al. (Henning 2004). The respondents (plaintiffs) in this 
1
 During 2000-2003 the world’s antitrust authorities have had to cope on average with 23 newly 
discovered international cartels per year; in the first half of the 1990s, fewer than four were 
discovered each year on average.  Connor, “Private International Cartels: Effectiveness, Welfare, and 
Anticartel Enforcement,”(“Private International Cartels”), Research in Agricultural and Applied 
Economics, Staff Paper 03-12 at 15 (2003), available at http://agecon.lib.umn.edu/cgi-
bin/pdf_view.pl?paperid=11506&fty pe=.pdf.
2
  Only one or two international cartels formed before the 1970s aimed at controlling prices in the 
whole industrialized world; even in these cases their intention to include Australia or Japan in their 
orbit is questionable.
3case are a group of foreign feed manufacturers and wholesalers that bought bulk vitamins in 
the 1990s (Empagran is an Ecuadorian company). Their purchases occurred wholly outside 
the United States in countries that have no laws that permit private antitrust suits to recover 
damages from price-fixing conduct3.  The respondents (defendants) are companies that have 
been convicted of international price fixing of bulk vitamins by the United States’ 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and several other antitrust authorities outside the United States.  
Moreover, the defendants have agreed to pay record amounts of compensation to thousands 
of U.S. buyers of vitamins stemming from private treble-damage actions under the 1890 
Sherman Act. Empagram wants to have the same right to sue as U.S. buyers, even though its 
purchases are “wholly foreign”. 
On January 17, 2003 by a 2-1 vote a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of the 
District of Columbia found for the plaintiffs; this decision “…in effect opened the doors of 
the courthouse to the world” (Henning 2003:1).  On September 11, 2003 the full Court of 
Appeals voted 4-3 to sustain the panel’s January decision:  
“The same conduct injures both foreign plaintiffs and domestic plaintiffs, and is 
clearly the conduct that Congress aims to reach with our antitrust laws” (ibid.). 
The Appeals Court was referring to a feature of the Sherman Act called extraterritoriality.  
This feature arises from the language of the Sherman Act, which declares illegal all explicitly 
collusive pricing conduct that “affects trade and commerce of the United States.”  That is, 
price-fixing agreements that are carried out inside or outside United States’ territory are 
illegal because they affect sales in the United States.  Without such a provision U.S. price 
fixers could escape prosecution simply by chartering a boat and meeting 20 miles offshore.  
Moreover, legal cartels such as U.S. Webb-Pomerene export associations might be tempted 
to control domestic prices through their export activities.  Similarly, collusion on exports to 
the United States would go unpunished were it not for the extraterritorial reach of the 
Sherman Act. However, until this suit was initiated, it was generally assumed that 
transactions wholly outside the U.S. market would not qualify for treble damages in private 
suits.  Thus, this principle of “partial” extraterritoriality is widely accepted as an essential 
feature for the effectiveness of U.S. (and other nations’) antitrust laws, but how extensive this 
feature should be is the nub of the issue.
As a legal matter there are two separable issues to be considered, one of subject-matter 
jurisdiction and one of standing in private antitrust suits (Hausfeld et al. 2004, Shapiro et al. 
2004). The subject-matter issue in Empagram is whether a 1982 amendment to the Sherman 
Act called the Foreign Trade Improvements Act (FTAIA) applies to “wholly foreign” direct 
purchases from a global cartel.  This amendment was intended to clarify what type of 
commerce is actionable under the antitrust laws.  The FTAIA authorizes the application of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act when the defendant’s conduct affects both domestic (U.S.) and 
3
 Proctor & Gamble Co. and six of its foreign affiliates were originally among the plaintiffs, but their 
claims are being held in abeyance (Hausfeld, Appellants’ Response to the Appellees’ Petition for 
Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing en Banc, Empagran S.A .et al., Appellants, v. F Hoffmann-
LaRoche, Ltd. et al., Appellees (March 24, 2003), 2. There is also an Australian respondent; Australia 
does permit single-damages private suits. 
4foreign commerce if such conduct has “…a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable 
effect…” on U.S. consumers, producers, or exporters (Davis 2003: 31)4.  The plaintiffs 
believe that the FTAIA does not apply to international cartels, only to export sales (Hausfeld 
2004: 3-4).  Even if the law applies to the plaintiffs’ purchases, the effects on U.S. commerce 
were direct, substantial and foreseeable.  
The second issue in Empagran is whether the FTAIA extends the protection of U.S. courts to 
antitrust violations when the “foreign effect” is a cartelized price paid by a defendant on a 
transaction outside the United States.  This latter situation might be called “full 
extraterritoriality.”  The plaintiffs argue that full extraterritoriality will serve the purposes of 
the Sherman Act because they are direct buyers clearly injured by the cartel’s illegal conduct, 
their claims will deter conduct that adversely affects U.S. commerce, and their claims can be 
easily managed simultaneously with those of domestic direct buyers (ibid. 4).
The Supreme Court agreed to hear this case because decisions in two other Circuits are split 
on the issue.  In the 2001 Kruman decision in the 2nd Circuit in New York permitted wholly 
foreign buyers to share in the roughly $500 million in damages paid by Sotheby’s and 
Christie’s after the two auction houses were convicted of price fixing (Id.).  However, in Den 
Norske Stats Oljeselkap the same year by the 5th Circuit in New Orleans concerning a global 
conspiracy in the market for heavy lift marine barges turned down a similar suit by a 
Norwegian oil company on the grounds that it did not have jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court received 19 amicus briefs in the Empagran appeal.  Four of these briefs, 
from seven foreign nations, made the case that extending standing to foreign purchases 
would encourage forum shopping, undermine these countries’ leniency programs, and be 
adverse to international comity.  The United States Government also argued that its highly 
successful corporate leniency program would be imperiled by the increased private antitrust 
liability that would be faced by leniency applicants should the plaintiffs prevail (Taft and 
Graubert 2004).  However, each of these governments’ positions was opposed by three 
amicus briefs submitted by academic legal scholars5. Three briefs in support of the 
4
 Davis, U.S. Antitrust Treatment of International Cartels, 17 Antitrust, 31-35 (2003) (surveys six 
appellate decisions in 2002-2003 in which the courts have attempted to clarify the FTAIA.)
5
 It is notable that all five of the briefs submitted by academic amici were in support of the plaintiffs. 
See Bernheim, Brief of Certain Professors of Economics as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, et al., Petitioners v. Empagran et al., Respondents, et al., 2003 U.S. Briefs 
724. (March 15, 2004), Bush Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, No. 03-742, F. 
Hoffmann LaRoche, Ltd. et al., Petitioners, v. Empagran S.A., et al., Respondents, 2003 U.S. Briefs 
724. (March 15, 2004), Michaels, Buxbaum, and Watt. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in 
Support of Respondents , F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, et al., Petitioners v. Empagran et al., Respondents, 
et al., 2003 U.S. Briefs 724, (March 15, 2004).
, First and Fox .  Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Scholars in Support of Respondents, F. Hoffmann-
LaRoche, et al., Petitioners v. Empagran et al., Respondents, et al., 2003 U.S. Briefs 724. (March 15, 
2004), Stiglitz and Orszag, Brief of Amici Curiae Economists in Support of Respondents, F. 
Hoffmann-LaRoche, et al., Petitioners v. Empagran et al., Respondents, et al., 2003 U.S. Briefs 724 
(March 15, 2004).
.
5defendants were sponsored by business organizations, which argued that a decision in favor 
of the plaintiffs would unnecessarily intrude into the free functioning of markets and would 
make life difficult for multinational corporations. This paper does not address the issues of 
leniency programs or comity except in passing.
2.OBJECTIVES
This paper presents two major economic arguments that support a decision in favor o f full 
extraterritoriality.  First, I find that conduct relating to wholly foreign purchases is an integral 
component for affecting domestic commerce in the context of international price-fixing 
conspiracies. Specifically, international cartelists must prevent international geographic 
arbitrage in order to carry out a successful international cartel6.  The essentiality of arbitrage 
is what makes the effects on U.S. commerce direct.
Second, I present empirical evidence that under the current regime of legal sanctions, the 
global aspirations of the new cartelists offer an insuperable challenge to a core aim of the 
antitrust laws -- deterrence.  The broad geographic harm generated by the scores of modern 
global price-fixing conspiracies has overwhelmed the ability of corporate antitrust sanctions 
to provide enough financial disincentives to discourage the formation of similar cartels in the 
future. These sanctions are inadequate to deter cartel formation because, in spite of notable 
improvements in recent years, the probability of being caught by one or more of the world’s 
antitrust authorities remains well below 100% and because the expected illegal monopoly 
profits made worldwide are more than sufficient to compensate would-be conspirators for 
their expected liabilities in jurisdictions with effective antitrust laws and enforcement7.  
Permitting foreign buyers who purchased the products of international cartels abroad to 
pursue civil antitrust damages actions in U.S. courts will make deterrence more likely and 
thereby protect U.S. consumers and the U.S. economy from future cartel injuries. Deterrence 
will improve because the civil damages collected by direct purchasers have the potential to 
increase by 200% to 700% above the levels observed in the 1990s and because the 
probability of discovery of clandestine collusive behavior is much higher as buyers in scores 
of new jurisdictions will have incentives to investigate and expose the conspiracy.
6
 The relationship of geographic arbitrage to the effectiveness of global cartel effectiveness seems to 
have been first mentioned in Connor, Connor, Global Price Fixing: Our Customers are the Enemy 
(“Global Price Fixing”) (2001), 208-209.  Both of the other briefs written by economists Bernheim, 
supra n. 5, Stiglitz and Orszag, supra n. 5, agree on this point.  In a personal telephonic 
communication to the author, Orszag said that the importance of arbitrage had been overlooked in the 
economic literature before 2001. 
7
 The OECD, “Report on the Nature and Impact of Hard Core Cartels and Sanctions against Cartels 
under National Competition Laws” (DAFFE/COMP (2002) 7), Organization of Economic Co-
Operation and Development (April 9, 2002).
 (2002) presents survey data from a large number of member countries showing that the great 
majority of national antitrust fines imposed on international cartels in the 1990s failed to recover 
single damages (Annex A). These are not typical cases, but rather exceptionally successful 
government prosecutions.  Supplemented by five estimates from Connor, Private International 
Cartels, the mean recovery of national damages was 81% and the median was 63%.  Bernheim, supra 
n. 5, Stiglitz and Orszag, supra n. 5, Evenett, supra n. 5, 1244) also conclude that deterrence of 
contemporary cartels by national antitrust authorities is insufficient.
6This paper attempts to validate these conclusions by drawing upon research on private 
international cartels that has appeared in the past eight years8.  To do so, this paper will 
describe the salient economic features of the global vitamins cartel, calculations of the 
amount of injury caused for buyers in the United States and elsewhere, corporate financial 
sanctions imposed, the ways in which these cartels were similar to others prosecuted in the 
past decade, evidence of recidivism in international price fixing, and how deterrence will be 
significantly enhanced should wholly foreign direct buyers have standing to sue under the 
Sherman Act.  
This research demonstrates that the international vitamin cartel generated the largest total of 
antitrust fines and penalties in history, which are calculated to be between $4.4 and $5.6 
billion.  But the cartel’s monopoly profits in all areas of the world were $9 to $13 billion.  
Thus, the criminal and civil justice systems of the globe produced fines and damages that 
amounted to at most only half of this cartel's illegal profits.  These sanctions are much less 
than the amount needed to discourage future cartel formation. One of the best ways to 
discourage cartels is to increase the expected costs in the event the participants are caught, in 
order that the expected penalties exceed the expected benefits.  As a practical matter, this 
deterrence benefit to the United States' consumers and its economy -- something surely 
intended by Congress – is likely to be achieved only if federal law is construed to give 
injured foreign customers like Respondents the power to sue in the courts of the United 
States under American antitrust laws.
3. THE VITAMINS CARTEL, 1990-1999.
Decisions about raising the prices of vitamins A and E began in discussions in Switzerland 
and Germany among F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, BASF, and Rhône-Poulenc (now Aventis) in 
late 1989.9  Soon afterward the Japanese chemical manufacturer Eisai agreed to raise the 
price of vitamin E effective January 1990.  It was logical for the conspirators to begin with 
vitamins A and E because they had the largest sales of the 16 products that would eventually 
be cartelized, were dominated by the four manufacturers (at least 87% of global supply), and 
were well protected from entry by new sellers because of the difficulty of the synthetic 
8 Some of that research appears in Connor, Global Price Fixing , Connor, Private International Cartels, Connor 
and Lande, Price-Fixing Overcharges: Legal and Economic Evidence, Staff Paper, Research in Agricultural and 
Applied Economics, available at http://agecon.lib.umn.edu (forthcoming 2004) (“Price Fixing Overcharges”), 
Evenett, Levenstein, and Suslow,  International Cartel Enforcement: Lessons from the 1990s, 24 World 
Economy (2001), 1221-1246, and First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of 
International Competition Law, 68 Antitrust Law Journal (2001), 711-733..  
9
 Information about the cartel is drawn from published sources, including Connor, Global Price 
Fixing, 277-337, 368-379, 405-407, 463-476, supplemented by scores of publicly available press 
accounts.  A particularly rich source of information is the European Commission’s decision of 
November 21, 2001.  See Commission Case COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamins, Commission Decision of 
November 21, 2001 (“EC Vitamins Case”), reprinted in L-6 Official Journal of the European 
Communities 1 (10.1.2003) available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/ 
2003/l_006/l_00620030110en00010089.pdf .
7chemistry involved.10  The number of cartelized products grew to eight by January 1991, and 
by the end of 1991 at least 20 parent-company manufacturers would be involved in a 
conspiracy involving 16 products. 
With respect to two products, price fixing was effective for only four years, but with respect 
to most this was a durable conspiracy.  Price fixing of vitamin H became ineffective in April 
1994 after 30 months of operation, and the cartel ceased price control of vitamin C shortly 
thereafter because of a flood of Chinese exports induced by cartel-inflated high prices. 
However, with respect to many products the cartel was still effectively raising prices above 
non-collusive levels in February 1999 when definitive evidence of the conspiracy came into 
the hands of DOJ from a company seeking leniency in exchange for cooperation.  With 
respect to one product, the cartel was active for nearly 11 years; with respect to several 
others, the cartel operated effectively for nearly ten years.
Whether tracked in euros, U.S. dollars, or Swiss francs, market prices in the United States, 
Canada, and Western Europe began to rise almost immediately after higher list prices were 
announced by the vitamins manufacturers.11  In the cases of some products prices peaked just 
before the cartel was exposed; in others they peaked years before the cartel’s ability to fix 
prices with respect to that product dissolved.  But in all cases, selling prices rose to levels 
greater than those observed prior to the collusive agreements and well above those observed 
after they broke apart. The price increases cannot be fully explained by either increases in 
production cost or by unexpected surges in demand.  The pattern of price changes in North 
America and Europe are remarkably parallel.  Prices in all other parts of the world were 
similarly affected, though the average overcharges may have varied slightly from those 
observed in North America or Western Europe.12
Besides setting list prices and rigging bids on tenders from larger customers, the vitamin
makers engaged in much other conduct in order to assure the success of their conspiracy to 
fix prices.  Global Price Fixing, supra n. 6, 305-317.  They agreed on global and regional 
sales quotas, generally based on historical levels.  They shared production and sales 
information to monitor their adherence to prices and market allocations.  They developed 
plans to thwart entry by producers outside the collusive groups. They set many common 
terms of sale, such as discounts, delivery, and restrictions on customers’ resales.  
The cartel was managed through three levels of managers; the lowest level had face-to-face 
meetings quarterly to adjust prices in several currencies.  The frequency of these meetings is 
instructive.  Although with respect to each product the cartel had impressive coordination of 
10
 The products ultimately involved were vitamins A, B1, B2, B3 (niacin), B4 (choline chloride), B5, 
B6, B9 (folic acid), B12, C, D3, and H (biotin); three carotinoids; and vitamin premixes.  The U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ), Canadian Competition Bureau (CBC), and European Commission fined 
the defendants for violations with respect to different combinations of these 16 products.  For 
example, only the DOJ fined firms for premixes, only the CBC for B12, and only the EC for D3; 
however all three entities prosecuted the makers of vitamins A, E, C, and many other vitamins. 
11
 See EC Vitamins Case 86-89; Global Price Fixing 319-331.
12
 An official statement describing the price effects in South Korea, for example, which imports all its 
vitamin supplies, confirms the similarity in price effects.  Korea Fair Trade Commission, “The KFTC 
Imposes Surcharges on the International Cartel of Vitamin Companies” (Press Release April 25,
2003, available at http://ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/vitaminl.doc).
8total industry supply and market prices, it had a limited ability to affect changes in demand 
and no power over currency exchange rates.  With few exceptions, the markets into which 
the vitamins cartel sold products had floating currency exchange rates that moved daily in 
response to changes in macroeconomic conditions. Moreover, it is important to note that bulk 
vitamins were high priced, storable commodities that were usually shipped in large quantities 
great distances.13  International shipping costs for vitamins in the 1990s were well under 5% 
of the manufacturers’ price.14  Under such conditions, if changes in currency exchange rates 
were sharp enough, buyers would find it profitable to sell stored vitamins from countries with 
depreciated currencies to countries with appreciated currencies; prices in the latter areas 
would then fall below the cartel’s preferred levels.  This is called geographic arbitrage.
Arbitrage undermines the ability of international cartels to set prices at the most profitable 
level in each currency zone and could even destroy collusive arrangements. For example, 
during 1990-1998 the value of the U.S. dollar relative to the Deutschmark varied by as much 
as 41%, and during 1991 the rates changed by more than 25%. Consider what might happen 
if the vitamins cartel set the national prices of its vitamins only once each year.  If the 
vitamins cartel set the price of vitamin E in Deutschmarks when this currency was weak 
against the dollar, a U.S. chemical wholesaler could make a quick and handsome profit by 
exporting the vitamin to Germany when the Deutschmark later strengthened.15  The cartel 
would sell a greater amount of vitamins at a relatively low price in the United States but 
would lose the high priced sales in Germany to this entrepreneurial exporter.  If sales 
diversions of this type became large enough, the total monopoly profits could decline to a 
level inadequate to compensate the cartel members for their legal risk. Many cartels attempt 
to forbid the practice of reselling by their customers.  But the only way cartelists can 
effectively prevent geographic arbitrage is to make it unprofitable by frequently resetting 
13
 The majority of the cartel’s members had most of their vitamin factories in Europe, from which 
they exported the majority of the output to other continents.  The majority of U.S. consumption was 
satisfied by imports.  During the affected periods, vitamin A sold for $100-$200/lb., vitamin E for 
$60-$90/lb., vitamin C $30-$40/lb., and most of the other vitamins in between.   
14
 Europe-U.S. and Europe-Asia transportation costs for these products were less than $1/lb. These 
low oceanic transport rates can be inferred from data published by UNCTAD, see United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development,  World Maritime Transport 1998 71 (1998), which shows 
that for all commodities the ratio of transport costs to import value was 5% in 1990 and 1995; most 
internationally traded goods are much lower in price than organic chemicals, which is what vitamins 
are.  Other evidence was supplied in exhibits submitted in the lysine trial United States v. Andreas,
No. 96 CR 762 (N.D. Ill.).  See Global Price Fixing 217-219.  ADM spent only $0.10 to $0.13 per 
pound in transporting, storing, and merchandising lysine made in Illinois and shipped everywhere in 
the world at a time when lysine sold for merely $0.85 to $1.25 per pound.  Lysine international 
transfer costs were thus from 8% to 15% of sales value, yet the lysine-cartel managers expressed 
worries about geographic arbitrage.  See infra at 9.  In terms of its ability to enter international trade, 
lysine is very much like most bulk vitamins, a powder that must be protected from humidity.
15
  In 1991 the Deutschmark was worth as little as $0.55 and appreciated to $0.69.  See  
http://www.oanda.com/convert/fx history.  Even if transportation costs were a generous 5% of export 
costs, by timing its purchase and resale correctly our hypothetical U.S. wholesaler could sell at a net 
increase in price of 20% and make a much higher mark-up on the export transaction than it would 
make in the U.S. market. If the dollar strengthened against the Mark, the incentive for a reverse 
diversion would occur.  
9domestic cartel prices in all regions of the world using current exchange rates to ensure that 
prices remain close together.  
We know from direct evidence that comparable cartels were conscious of the problem 
presented by geographic arbitrage. Despite the increased danger of discovery, most modern 
cartels have had quarterly meetings to deal with this problem.  In its three years of operation, 
the well-documented lysine cartel had at least 23 face-to-face meetings in order to adjust 
local prices in various currencies whenever exchange movements got the cartel’s prices out 
of line for maximum profitability.  Global Price Fixing 203.  During that cartel’s first few 
months of operation, the price was set in U.S. dollars only.  By the end of the cartel, prices 
were set in at least nine currencies. Id. 238. A memorandum of a meeting of the cartel in 
Paris in 1993 written by an executive of the Ajinomoto Co. specifically refers to the need to 
combat geographic arbitrage by non-cooperative wholesalers:
“With the [Deutschmark] strong against the $, presently it is 22% higher than in the 
U.S.  If the difference between Europe and the U.S. becomes bigger, ill-reputed 
dealers will start working and goods will enter Europe from the U.S. and decrease the 
price.”16
4. AFFECTED SALES OF THE VITAMINS CARTEL.
Although the vitamins cartel is not different in kind from other international cartels of the 
late 20th century, it was one of exceptionally large scale. The most conventional measure of a 
cartel’s size is affected commerce, i.e., the sales revenues generated by the cartelized product 
during the price-fixing period.17  The dates of effective price control by the vitamins cartel 
are well known.  Sales in the U.S., Canadian, and EU markets are also known with a fair 
degree of precision.18  Sales in other parts of the world can be estimated as a residual amount 
after ascertaining the world totals.
The total affected sales in the United States were once estimated to have been as low as $5 
billion in public statements by DOJ officials.  See “US Slaps Two Big European Companies 
with Huge Fines in Vitamin Case,” Agence France Press, May 20, 1999 (quoting Assistant 
Attorney General Joel Klein).  This figure appears to include only a few of the largest 
vitamins, whereas subsequent prosecutions make it clear that the cartel involved a wider 
array of vitamins and vitamin premixes.  A reasonable estimate of U.S. affected sales of the 
full array of 16 vitamin products is approximately $7.4 billion.
16 United States v. Andreas, No. 96 CR 762 (N.D. Ill.), Trial Exhibit 10-T (translation from Japanese).
17 Affected sales are normally dated from the time at which the first agreement was made until the 
date of the cartel’s last meeting.  Another approach is to begin counting sales on the first date on 
which an agreed change in list or transaction prices were changed or became effective.  In this brief 
we follow the more conservative second approach.  Both approaches undercount sales in the months 
following the formal dissolution of a cartel when prices remain elevated above what they would 
otherwise be in the absence of unlawful collusion because of institutional lags in price cuts.  
18
 Sales data for vitamin premixes are difficult to obtain, and it is not always clear that total published 
or asserted sales data for all vitamins include premixes.  Vitamin premixes are mixtures of bulk 
vitamins that are tailored for the nutritional needs of various types of farm animals.  The United 
States is the only jurisdiction in which the vitamins manufacturers were sanctioned for price fixing 
the market for premixes.
10
Sales of the vitamins cartel in the European Economic Area19 were released by the European 
Commission in its published decision regarding the fines imposed on the conspiring
manufacturers.  See EC Vitamins Case at 4.  The affected sales of bulk vitamins (not 
including premixes) in the EEA are estimated to have been US$8.3 billion. Affected sales in 
Canada were given in statements of the Canadian Competition Bureau to be C$700 to C$750 
million (US$530 to US$570).  Finally, based upon reports of global sales it is possible to 
estimate sales in the rest of the world (primarily Asia, Africa, and Latin America).  During 
the price-fixing period, sales of bulk vitamins in the rest of the world were approximately 
$18.2 billion.  Therefore, global affected commerce of bulk vitamins and premixes (the latter 
in the United States only), reached $34.3 billion – the largest amount of affected commerce 
ever to result from a global price-fixing cartel.20
The significance of this sales calculation lies in the geographic location of vitamins sales 
during the cartel’s active period.  The three jurisdictions with the most effective anticartel 
enforcement – the USA, Canada, and the EU – accounted for less than half of worldwide 
sales.21  It follows that, if the rate of monopoly profits made by the cartelists was roughly the 
same across the globe, then the majority of those profits were made in jurisdictions where 
anticartel enforcement is weak or nonexistent.  The ability of international cartelists to garner 
monopoly profits in weak antitrust jurisdictions adversely affects deterrence.
5. ECONOMIC INJURIES CAUSED BY THE VITAMINS CARTEL.
Numerous economic analyses have been conducted by economists and parties to private suits 
in the United States in which calculations of the economic injuries caused by vitamins price 
fixing were central issues.  There appears to be a substantial consensus among these 
individuals on the size of the vitamins cartel’s price-fixing overcharges.
On May 20, 1999, the day the guilty pleas of the three largest members of the vitamins cartel 
were announced, Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein stated:
The vitamin cartel is the most pervasive and harmful criminal antitrust conspiracy 
ever uncovered…  The enormous effort that went into maintaining the conspiracy 
reflects the magnitude of the illegal revenues it generated… 22
Several subsequent statements by DOJ officials echoed the assertion that the vitamins cartel 
was the most injurious to the U.S. economy of any international price-fixing conspiracy ever 
19 The EEA includes the EU and a few other countries that are members of the European Free Trade 
Area but that have not joined the EU; Norway is an example.  These countries have agreed to allow 
the EC to enforce its competition laws in their national jurisdictions.  Harding and Joshua, Regulating 
Cartels in Europe: A Study of Legal Control of Corporate Delinquency  (2003), 93.
20
 The largest set of affected commerce data on post-1980 international cartels can be found in Private 
International Cartels.  The intra-European cement cartel, which was fined by the EU in January 1992, 
might have been slightly larger as measured by affected commerce at least when adjusted for 
inflation.  The cement cartel, however, was not a global cartel in the sense being used in this brief. 
21The USA, Canada, and the EU accounted for 21%, 2%, and 25% of affected world vitamin sales, 
respectively. Data on file with amicus Connor.
22
“Press Conference with Attorney General Janet Reno and Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney General, 
Antitrust Division,” Federal News Service, May 20, 1999.
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prosecuted by the United States.23  Prosecutors for the Canadian Ministry of Justice that 
handled the vitamins case were quoted in the press stating that vitamins prices were 30% 
higher than competitive levels.  Global Price Fixing 405.  Similarly, the vitamins decision of 
the European Commission clearly concludes that the cartels caused a significant increase in 
EU prices of bulk vitamins.  EC Vitamins Case at 69. That fact that the three governments 
imposed on the vitamins conspirators fines that were the highest in history speaks for itself.
Unlike DOJ’s terse press releases and sentencing memoranda, the EC decision is exemplary 
in providing numerous details about the operations, size, and European price effects of the 
vitamins cartel.  From graphical evidence provided on the prices of seven vitamins, it is clear 
that the prices in euros rose significantly compared to the years before price fixing began.  Id.
at 86-89. Moreover, the post-cartel prices are lower than the pre-cartel prices, a trend that 
suggests that costs of production during the relevant period probably fell.  Therefore, 
applying a simple before-and-after technique to calculate price effects will in all likelihood 
provide estimates that understate the true overcharge.  See Connor, “Global Cartels Redux: 
The Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation” in Kwoka and White, eds., The Antitrust 
Revolution 263-267. (4th ed. 2004).
The simple mean price-fixing overcharge in the EU was 29% when measured with the pre-
cartel prices as the competitive benchmark and 38% when applying post-cartel prices as the 
benchmark (i.e., the so-called but-for price).24  The price effects were highest for vitamin E, 
the largest product in terms of sales, and lowest for vitamin C, a product that was subject to 
stiff import competition from Chinese manufacturers after a relatively short time.  See Global 
Price Fixing 336.  If one weights the overcharges by the sales sizes of the individual 
products, the mean overcharge was 31% to 42%.
In a case involving choline chloride one of the smaller vitamins, Mitsui, DuCoa, Chinook, 
and affiliated companies were found guilty of price-fixing in a conspiracy that ended in 2003.  
The jury found the injury to be $49.5 million and awarded treble damages. See “4 Companies 
Found Liable In Price Fixing Of Vitamin B4,” New York Times, June 15, 2003 at A20.  This 
overcharge conservatively represents 38% of affected sales.
Finally, there have been a number of empirical studies of the price effects of the vitamins 
cartel by academic economists and economic historians.  Professor Connor’s estimates are on 
average somewhat lower than the EU price effects: allowing for some uncertainty, he 
concluded the weighted average is 25% to 28% of affected commerce.  Global Price Fixing
336.  In the United States, as in Europe, vitamin E had the highest U.S. overcharge rate and 
vitamin C one of the lowest.  Applying the U.S. overcharge rates to global sales results in an 
estimated world overcharge of $7 to $8 billion.  Id.  Economic historians Suslow and 
23 See, e.g., Testimony of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, before the 
House Judiciary Committee, Federal Document Clearinghouse Congressional Testimony, April 11, 
2000. The only other U.S. case that is a contender for the most harmful cartel is the heavy electric 
power equipment conspiracy that was prosecuted in 1960-61, but this was a solely domestic cartel 
and its price effects were relatively small.  See Connor and Lande, Price-Fixing Overcharges.
24 These were highly concentrated markets before and during the collusive conduct. It is likely that 
tacit collusion marked the behavior of these industries prior to the formation of the cartels.  Thus, the 
benchmark prices used here probably are above perfectly competitive levels.  The median 
overcharges were 25%.
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Levenstein cited North American overcharge figures of 20% and 30% in a survey of modern 
cartels.  Connor and Lande, supra n. 8, App. Table 2.  A sophisticated econometric model of 
world trade in bulk vitamins also yielded conclusions about collusive price effects.  See 
Clarke and Evenett, “The Deterrent Effects of National Anti-Cartel Laws: Evidence from the 
International Vitamins Cartel,” AEI-Brookings Joint Center Working Paper 02-13, Table 7 at 
31 (2002) available at http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/ page.php?id=218.  
What is of special interest about this study is that the authors are able to calculate 
overcharges for the 19 countries outside the EU and North America with the strictest antitrust 
laws separately from those countries with weak antitrust enforcement; the former had 
overcharges averaging 13% while the latter incurred a 33% overcharge.  Therefore, it seems 
likely that monopoly profit rates from collusion in the rest of the world are higher than in the 
United States, Canada and the EU.  Finally, a dynamic simulation model fitted to parameters 
drawn from the vitamin C industry predicted the U.S. price during fully collusive and non-
collusive regimes.  See de Roos, “Collusion with a Competitive Fringe: An Application to 
Vitamin C,” 20-28 (unpublished manuscript October 2001) available at 
http://www.econ.yale.edu/~njd7/ docs/vitc.pdf.  One interpretation of the results is that U.S. 
vitamin C prices were 22% to 26% higher during the cartel period, which is quite remarkable 
given that this is was one of the products with respect to which the cartel was weakest and 
most fragile25. 
To summarize, the average price effects of the vitamins cartel appear to be lowest for buyers 
in the United States, averaging somewhere in the 20% to 35% range. Canada and Europe 
were higher, roughly in the 30% to 40% range. The rest of the word came closer to European 
levels than to U.S. levels. Applying these price effects to the affected sales mentioned in the 
previous section implies that global injuries were between $9 and $13 billion, of which 15% 
accrued in the United States, 1% in Canada, 26% in the EU, and 58% in the rest of the world.
6. CORPORATE CARTEL SANCTIONS.
The vitamins cartel has been the most harshly sanctioned conspiracy in antitrust history. 
Private International Cartels, supra n. 1, at 47-49, 52-53, 56-57, 106-111.  This section 
focuses on corporate monetary antitrust penalties, recognizing that corporate persons may be 
deterred in less measurable ways and that individuals were also punished.  Personal financial 
penalties, though small by comparison to corporate ones, and more serious personal criminal 
sanctions, may add to or interact with corporate sanctions in discouraging the formation or 
enlargement of cartels, but they are difficult to incorporate into a unified calculus of collusive 
deterrence.
Sanctions that would be imposed in the absence of an affirmance in the instant case will be 
inadequate to deter global price-fixing cartels. The Sentencing Guidelines, for example, call 
for a base fine of 20% of "affected sales" when an organization is being fined for price-
fixing.  See USSG 2R1.1(d).  These may be adjusted by a multiplier as high as 4.0 depending 
upon the defendant's "culpability score.  Id. at 8C2.6; 8C2.5.  In practice, most guilty 
25
 In a personal communication from Dr. de Roos, the method I used to derive an overcharge is described as 
“…a comparison of two counterfactuals. Ie the difference between a world described by my model 
with collusion, and a world described by my model without collusion.” 
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international cartel participants earn culpability multipliers of from 1.5 to 3.5.  Global Price 
Fixing 356-378.
Unless global conduct is held unlawful as a matter of United States law, only U.S. affected 
sales will be used in calculating the base fine.  Using global sales to determine harm could 
increase the maximum liability of typical international price fixers by a multiple of three to 
six.
Further, in discussing the economic effects of anticartel sanctions, it is essential to 
distinguish theoretically available legal sanctions from those actually applied as a matter of 
custom and policy.  Historically, the Government has also ordinarily recommended 
substantial downward departures in these cases even from the fine levels specified by the 
Guidelines.26  Members of modern international cartels have been granted very large 
downward departures for minimal cooperation almost as a matter of course, driving actual 
fines down well below single U.S. damages in almost all cases.  Global Price Fixing 356-
377.  In the vitamins case, the second through fifth firms to plead guilty were granted average 
downward departures of about 80% from the Guidelines’ maximum fines.  Global Price 
Fixing 375. As a result of U.S. sentencing practices, its criminal fines amounted to less than 
11% of the vitamins cartel’s global monopoly profits.
The EU has quite different standards for imposing its administrative fines, which are 
calculated on the basis of the seriousness and duration of the violation. The European 
Commission (EC) is limited to imposing a maximum fine of 10% of a firm’s global sales in 
the year prior to the Commission’s action.  For a single-product firm with sales only in the 
EU, the maximum EU fine could be a large share of the profits accruing from a fairly 
harmful cartel.  However, most members of global cartels are highly diversified firms, and 
the cartelized product is a small share of the company’s portfolio.  For example, for the 
leading member of the vitamins cartel, F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, vitamins accounted for merely 
8% of its total sales.  For such firms, a durable high-overcharge cartel can easily generate 
monopoly profits well above what an EU fine could possibly disgorge.  Moreover, as in the 
United States, generous reductions in fines are routinely granted for minimal cooperation 
with the EC. Actual fines imposed by the EC for the same global cartels have on average 
been about 20% lower than those imposed in the United States.  Connor, “La Mondalisation 
des Délits en Col Blanc: Les Cartels Agroalimentaires des Années 1990,” 277-278 Économie rurale 
99, 119 (Septembre-Décembre 2003).
The Clayton Act appears to be unique among the world’s antitrust statutes in permitting 
treble damages for direct purchases from effective cartels.  Harding and Joshua, Regulating 
Cartels in Europe 236-239 In the case of the vitamins cartel, if U.S. buyers actually 
recovered treble damages, this alone would have amounted to about 45% of the global 
monopoly profits made by this cartel. Should Respondents be permitted to proceed, private 
recovery could amount to 300% of global damages instead of 45%.  Clearly the question of 
standing can mightily affect the ability of private antitrust actions to deter international price 
fixing.
26
 I am aware of only one instance in which a defendant in a global cartel was required to pay a fine 
close to the maximum amount specified in the Guidelines: Mitsubishi after an adverse jury decision in 
the graphite electrodes case.
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Because of various practical impediments, private plaintiffs have rarely if ever attained treble 
damages. Historically, what has been observed for domestic price-fixing cases is that direct 
purchasers have recouped on average less than single damages.  See Lande, “Are Antitrust 
‘Treble’ Damages Really Single Damages?,” 54 Ohio State L. J. 115, 171 (1993).27  The 
recovery rate for contemporary international cartels is also below single damages; only three 
examples could be found of settlements above single damages, and none as high as double 
damages.  Private International Cartels, App. Table 6B at 129-31.28  However, if wholly 
foreign direct buyers were to be permitted to bring treble-damage suits in U.S. courts, 
recoveries at historical rates would push total private recoveries to an average of about 75% 
of global overcharges.29 Combined with fines, these expanded private damages could 
approach optimal deterrence.
In sum, the maximum financial antitrust liability that would face global cartels in the absence 
of affirmance here would be, de jure, the sum of (1) five to six times the harm generated in 
the United States, (2) approximately single U.S. damages in the European Union, and (3) 
negligible fines or penalties elsewhere.  As noted above, the injuries caused by global cartels 
spread beyond North America and Western Europe.  Therefore, as a proportion of the 
monopoly profits garnered worldwide, the theoretical upper limit of lawful antitrust liability 
would be limited to approximately double global damages.  De facto the application of fines 
and private suits to global cartels has resulted in total monetary sanctions that have been less 
than double actual global damages in all cases and less than single damages on average.  In 
the end, then, even international cartels that are uncovered and prosecuted tend to be 
profitable. As explained below, such sanctions offer woefully suboptimal deterrence, but 
under the reading of the Sherman Act adopted below, deterrence might approach optimal 
levels.
7. THE VITAMINS CARTEL’S SANCTIONS.
The first source of monetary sanctions imposed upon the participants in the vitamins cartels 
were government fines, first imposed on the vitamins defendants by U.S. courts in a series of 
guilty pleas beginning in 1999.  All who are likely to plead appear now to have done so, with 
a total of $907 million collected in criminal fines. Canada was next with criminal fines of 
27 Recovery by indirect purchasers is available to residents of less than half of the States.  Settlement 
amounts in indirect purchaser suits against vitamins defendants are difficult to document because 
most terms are confidential, but are believed to be well under single damages in all cases, typically a 
small percentage of damages.  Indirect-purchaser suits of international cartels prosecuted by 
coalitions of state attorneys-general are of a similar order of magnitude.  In 2001 a coalition of state 
attorneys general negotiated a record $255 million settlement for sales to indirect purchasers with the 
six leading vitamins cartel defendants, less than 4% of global injuries.  See “Ryan Announces 
Historic $255 Million Antitrust Settlements Against International Vitamin Cartel,” PR Newswire, 
October 10, 2000.
28 The median ratio of settlement payouts to overcharges is 76%.  Private International Cartels 59 
(Table 20).
29 Information on legal costs for defendants is scanty.  In one well documented case (ADM  lysine), 
legal cost amounted to 9% of its total antitrust payouts. Global Price Fixing 536.  
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$100 million paid.  The EU imposed administrative fines of $759 million in 2001.30
Australia ordered a fine of $14 million and South Korea $3 million. Private International 
Cartels 56. Japan and Switzerland issued warnings to members of the cartel, but no fines. 
While Brazil and other jurisdictions are investigating the vitamins cartel, no further major 
fines are expected to be imposed in this case.
The second major source of sanctions is private actions by direct buyers, principally in the 
United States. Several federal cases have been resolved, with a total to date of $596 million 
in recovery and legal fees and costs. The biggest gap in our knowledge of the amount of 
sanctions is the size of the settlements for opt-outs from the so-called domestic “all- vitamins”
class action, In re: Vitamins Antitrust Litigation, Misc. No. 99-197 (D.D.C.). About 225 
companies of the 4000 original class-action plaintiffs opted to litigate on their own.  As these 
opt-outs represented more than 75% of class purchases, their settlements are likely to be 
substantial.  Assuming that they will settle for a somewhat larger percentage of affected sales 
than those buyers that remained in the class, amicus Connor estimates the total payout to be 
in the range of $1200 to $2400 million.  Similar civil actions are being litigated in Australia 
and Canada but are unlikely to result in large recoveries.  In the EU and the rest of the world 
civil liability is negligible for-price fixing violations.  Harding and Joshua, Regulating 
Cartels in Europe: A Study of Legal Control of Corporate Delinquency 236-239 (2003). 
While single damages are permitted in theory in a few European national courts, various 
practical impediments exist.  Id. 
To summarize, if foreign sales like those at issue in the instant case are not unlawful as a 
matter of American law, so that the Government must calculate base fines solely on the basis 
of domestic affected sales, then the maximum fine on international cartels by the United 
States, Canadian, and EU authorities will typically amount to less than double the damage 
caused by the cartel in the United States.  Civil liability is confined almost entirely to the 
U.S. court system and is unlikely to exceed double these U.S. damages.  If an international 
cartel confined its sales solely to the U.S. market, its members might face the prospect of 
treble or quadruple damages, but few international cartels are configured this way.31  Rather, 
sales and profits made in the U.S. market are typically less than one-third or one-fourth of the 
total.  In such cases, fines and penalties in all jurisdictions will be less than global monopoly 
profits. 
In the specific case of the vitamins cartel, the total antitrust fines and penalties are reckoned 
to be between $4.4 and $5.6 billion.  But, as was shown above, the best estimates of the 
cartel’s monopoly profits in all areas of the world are $9 to $13 billion.  The criminal and 
civil justice systems of the globe thus have failed to recover more than half of the cartel’s 
illegal profits.
8. THE VITAMINS CARTEL IS NOT ATYPICAL.
30
  These fines are under appeal and could be reduced, as they often are, by the Court of First Instance 
of the European Community.
31 Only 18 cases out of 167 modern international cartels were configured this way. Private 
International Cartels App. Table 3 at 115-120. 
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Most of the other international cartels of 1990s resemble the vitamins cartel in their 
operation, effectiveness, and sanctions imposed:32
• Vitamins are organic chemicals; 49 of the 167 products that were the subject of price-
fixing cartels uncovered by authorities between January 1990 and July 2003 were in organic 
chemicals markets.
• The vitamins conspirators were almost all manufacturers; the great majority of global 
cartelists are manufacturers.
• One-fourth of all international cartels sold to dispersed customers in the food and 
agricultural industries; half of the bulk vitamins ended up in animal feeds.
• The typical international cartel made less than half of its revenues in North America and 
the EU; so did the vitamins cartel.
• The median number of companies forming international cartels was five; the median 
number of companies involved in the vitamins cartel with respect to each product was three.
• More than 80% of international price fixers are headquartered in the EU or Japan; in 
vitamins it was 80%.
• No international cartel sold a differentiated consumer product; vitamins are unique 
chemicals sold to other manufacturers.
• In common with all other cartels, the vitamins cartel needed to combat the effects of 
international arbitrage on prices in high-prices regions.
• The mean duration of the vitamins cartel with respect to each product was 69 months; for 
all global cartels, 60 months; for all international cartels uncovered in 1996-1999, 75 months.
• The global financial antitrust penalties imposed on the vitamins conspirators was 31% to 
58% of economic harm caused; for international cartels affecting 29 products, the mean was 
55%.
• The total financial antitrust penalties imposed on the vitamins conspirators was 12% to 
16% of affected sales; the mean ratio for international cartels affecting 65 products was 12%.
9. INTERNATIONAL CARTEL RECIDIVISM.
Several of the vitamins manufacturers have been fined previously for price-fixing violations 
under U.S. or EU competition law.  Global Price Fixing 499-500.  F. Hoffmann-LaRoche or 
its holding company Roche AG, engaged in an overlapping price-fixing agreement with 
respect to 12 vitamin products.  Roche, one of the two companies identified as the 
ringleaders of the vitamins cartel, was fined $14 million by the United States in 1997 for its 
leading role in the citric acid cartel of 1991-1995. Global Price Fixing 395. Roche 
executives were obligated to provide full cooperation in antitrust matters by virtue of 
Roche’s guilty plea in the citric acid case, yet they continued to conspire on vitamins prices 
for two more years.  Moreover, there was testimony given at trial in 1998 in U.S. v. Andreas, 
No. 96 CR 762 (N.D. Ill.), that F. Hoffman-LaRoche had been a member of another, 
32 These facts are drawn Private International Cartels, passim, and Global Price Fixing  277-318.
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clandestine international cartel in the citric acid market in the late 1980s. Global Price Fixing
136. Although a U.S. pharmaceutical company was allegedly a member, this earlier citric 
acid conspiracy was never uncovered by any antitrust authorities.33 Thus, there is credible 
evidence that Roche is a true recidivist is the narrowest sense of the term.
Roche is not the only convicted member of the vitamins cartel to be fined for international 
price fixing in another line of business.  The large French chemical manufacturer Rhône-
Poulenc, which in 1999 merged with the leading German chemical firm Höchst to form 
Aventis, was subsequently given amnesty in 1999 by the European Commission for its role 
in the global conspiracy in the market for the amino acid methionine. Private International 
Cartels Table A.1. Höchst itself, which conspired with respect to vitamin B12, was 
convicted and fined $36 million by the United States in 1998 for its role in the global 
sorbates cartel; in 2003 the EU imposed a fine of $116 million on Höchst (by then Aventis) 
for the sorbates violation.  Id.  Thus, three of the co-conspirators in the vitamins cartels are 
known to have fixed prices in previous or concurrent international cartels that operated in the 
1990s.  Doubtless there are other instances of repeated violations of the antitrust laws by 
other members of the vast vitamins cartel that have not been discovered or publicly reported.
These three examples drawn for the vitamins case are neither isolated nor merely anecdotal.  
The phenomenon of repeated violations of the antitrust laws of the United States and the 
European Union has been the subject of scholarly examination.  See Private International 
Cartels App. Table 5 at 124-125.  This research collects information on international cartels 
involving 167 different products that were uncovered by one or more of the world’s antitrust 
authorities between January 1990 and July 2003.  These data are believed to be reasonably 
complete.  Out of the hundreds of companies identified as participants in these cartels, more 
than 50 companies participated in contemporary cartels with respect to two or more of these 
products.  Id.34  Five companies are known to have participated in price-fixing cartels with 
respect to ten or more products, and 13 in cartels with respect to five or more.  There are a 
few instances of true recidivism, but most of the cases just mentioned are matters of 
companies colluding in overlapping agreements with respect to multiple product lines. For 
example, the Dutch chemical maker Akzo Nobel engaged in international price-fixing 
agreements concerning ten product lines: choline chloride (vitamin B4), sodium gluconate, 
MCAA, soda ash, explosives, auto paints, organic peroxides, PVC additives, rubber 
processing chemicals, and MBS.  Id. 124.  Perhaps it is best to call such behavior serial price 
fixing.
10. DETERRING INTERNATIONAL CARTELS.
33 Unrebutted testimony in the same trial also revealed that two of the Japanese members of the global 
lysine cartel had thrice previously formed both international and domestic U.S. cartels in the lysine 
market.  Connor, “‘Our Customers Are Our Enemies:’ The Lysine Cartel of 1992-1995,” 18 Review 
of Industrial Organization 5, 6-7 (2001). Thus, two of the five lysine defendants convicted by the 
United States in 1996 had by that time fixed prices of lysine on four separate occasions. 
34 Some of these companies were also convicted or fined as members of purely domestic cartels or of 
international cartels that were active in periods prior to 1990.  Thus, these data on repeated 
participation are undercounts.
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The fact that so many companies engage in repeated violations of U.S. and EU competition 
laws is symptomatic of deeply rooted business behavior.  The roots of price-fixing conduct 
lie in the structures of markets.  See, e.g., Global Price Fixing 522-527; Private International 
Cartels 8-11.  Common to all discovered cartels is “small numbers” (a high degree of 
industrial concentration of ownership among sellers) coupled with a high degree of control of 
the market by members of the cartel.  Similarly, cartels are more effective when buyers are 
many and none purchase large shares of the cartelized product. A third nearly universal 
feature of markets with cartel activity is that the products are standardized commodities with 
few or no substitutes even when a cartel raises its price to a level well above normal. Storable 
products that are cheaply transported long distances make better candidates for 
internationally collusive schemes than perishable items.35
The vitamins cartel illustrates the importance of these market characteristics.  Global market 
concentration was high (the top four or five firms accounted for more than 75% of 
production), the cartel members comprised the top tier of manufacturers, more than ten 
thousand companies purchased bulk vitamins directly from the cartel, the biological 
functions of vitamins insured their uniqueness in demand, and high vitamin prices permitted 
long-distance trade.   
Beyond these three characteristics are a number of market features that generally facilitate 
overt collusion but that may not be necessary conditions.  Cartelized markets tend to be 
mature; growth tends to be steady and predictable; rapid changes in product design or in 
methods of manufacture tend to be things in the past.36  Transactions are typically made 
through private bilateral negotiations that are not directly observable to third parties, and 
most sales are made by means of long term supply contracts.  Terms of sale (delivery 
services, quantity discounts, rebates, recognized grades, quality premiums, etc.) have long 
been standardized throughout the industry.  Leading companies may have had years of 
strategic interaction with one another.  Barriers to entry are formidable, thus severely limiting 
the number of potential entrants should prices rise significantly.  Again, the markets for bulk 
vitamins by and large display these facilitating factors.
Such a mix of market characteristics is found in only a minority of the world’s industries.  
The structures and practices in the manufacturing and mining industries foster cartelization, 
whereas the organization of retail sales of manufactures does not.  Manufacturing of organic 
chemicals embodies them, while production of inorganic chemicals does not.
The import of these observations is that collusion is rational in some industries but foolhardy 
in others.  By calling collusion “rational” economists intend to characterize cooperative 
business choices that are expected to generate greater profits than alternative strategies.  See 
generally Polinsky and Shavell, “The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of the Law,” 
35
 The members of the lysine cartel for example were convicted for their price agreements in the dry 
lysine market. Liquid lysine, which sold for less than $0.50 per pound and could not be transported 
economically by tanker vehicles more than a few hundred miles from the plants in which it was made 
was not subject to direct price manipulation by the cartel.
36 Cartel formation is frequently, perhaps usually preceded by an actual or impending “crisis” (as 
perceived by cartel members): markedly slowing growth, falling prices, rising inventories, low rates 
of capacity utilization or similar conditions that have caused or are about to cause profits to decline to 
what are by the standards of the industry historically low rates.
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38 J. Economic Literature 45 (2000); Posner, Antitrust Law 266-274 (2d ed.  2001).  The 
field of legal economics that studies crime and punishment is founded on the idea that 
persons choose crime because the anticipated benefits exceed the expected losses.  When the 
benefits (monopoly profits) exceed the losses (antitrust fines and penalties), deterrence will 
not be achieved.37
There are two major reasons why it is rational for firms contemplating global price fixing to 
proceed.  First, actual cartel profits have historically exceeded the financial penalties meted 
out by the world’s courts and commissions.  It is reasonable to suppose that future 
expectations about the benefit/cost ratio of international price fixing will be tempered by 
historical experience. As this brief has demonstrated, the total collusive overcharges imposed 
by the vitamins cartel greatly exceeded the global fines and penalties extracted from the 
cartelists.  This result follows from the leniency policies of the most active anticartel 
authorities, from the difficulties of plaintiffs in U.S. civil suits in achieving double or even 
single damages, from the absence of civil suits abroad, and from the near absence of any kind 
of enforcement outside North America and the EU.38  The facts regarding anticartel sanctions 
presented above support a similar conclusion in the case of other global cartels uncovered 
since 1990. 
Second, global cartelists have reason to expect that their secret price fixing will probably 
remain hidden.  The probability of being apprehended by one or more of the world’s antitrust 
authorities is not known with certainty, but it is certainly less than 100%.  The most reliable 
sources assert that the probability of any kind of private cartel being caught before the 
agreement is dissolved for other reasons is in the range of 10% to 33%.  See Private 
International Cartels 63 (collecting sources).39  It is true that most of these estimates date 
from periods before the full force of today’s U.S. criminal sanctions and leniency 
inducements were felt.  Nevertheless, there is little reason to believe that the true probability 
of detection is outside this range.40
Even if corporate antitrust fines and penalties were to be applied in Europe and North 
America at their maximum levels, the low probability of detection alone may still result in 
suboptimal deterrence.  When one also considers the application of leniency policies in the 
negotiation of fines, the absence of criminal enforcement outside of two continents, and the 
inability of injured parties to seek civil restitution outside of North America, the profitability 
of global price fixing is assured.  An approach such as that taken by the court below is 
37 When they are equal, deterrence is said to be optimal.  Optimal deterrence theory usually assumes 
that the government has no residual uncertainty and that would-be corporate criminals are risk-
neutral.  If a corporation is instead risk-avoiding, the optimal punishment level for the same level of 
anticipated benefits will be lower.  
38
 Of course some cartels are uncovered and sued only by private parties, but the reverse is by far the 
most common pattern.  Once one antitrust authority is alerted to the existence of a cartel, these days 
the others will soon know. 
39
 The legal-economic literature on this point is scanty.  Seven sources are cited on the page cited in 
the text.  The only empirical economic study finds a 13% to 17% discovery rate. Even after detection, 
successful prosecution of objectively guilty international conspiracies is uncertain. 
40
  Polinsky and Shavell note that arrest rates for the most common felonious property crimes are 
between 13% and 17%.  Polinsky and Shavell, “The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of the 
Law,” 38 J. Econ. Lit. 45, 71 n. 77 (2000).
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necessary if the enforcement of American law is to have any realistic hope of protecting 
American consumers and the American economy by approaching optimal levels of 
deterrence of anticompetitive behavior by international price-fixing cartels. 
11. PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS
Modern international cartels with global reach present a knotty challenge to current antitrust 
enforcement practices.
Cartels that sell internationally tradable commodities and that aim to fix prices in two or 
more regions with different national currencies cannot control currency exchange rates.  As a 
consequence, private international cartels must prevent geographic arbitrage through frequent 
realignment of national prices if their control over price is to succeed.  The vitamins cartels 
and scores of the largest cartels uncovered by antitrust authorities since 1990 embody these 
characteristics, and direct evidence exists that cartel managers in fact were aware that 
unchecked arbitrage would undermine their scheme. Therefore, the purchases of wholly 
foreign buyers play an integral role in creating the antitrust injury incurred by wholly 
domestic direct purchasers.   
Even under ideal prosecutorial outcomes, in the absence of affirmance of the decision below, 
the global reach of modern cartels insures that the monetary payouts of guilty international 
cartelists cannot succeed in disgorging all the illegal cartel profits.  That is, the imposition of 
maximum government fines combined with fully successful civil suits in North America will 
inevitably result in amounts less than single global damages.  It would therefore be utterly 
rational for would-be cartelist to form or join an international price-fixing conspiracy.  Only 
if treble damages are available to wholly foreign buyers might the balance tip: if plaintiffs 
like Respondents are successful in American courts, the monetary penalties imposed on 
prosecuted members of cartels could, at least in theory, in most cases exceed the monopoly 
profits.  Cartel formation will be discouraged.
Even assuming prosecutorial conditions will resemble recent historical patterns of 
punishment, a judgment of affirmance will greatly improve international cartel deterrence 
and will lead it to approach optimal deterrence.  The precise degree of deterrence will depend 
on the perceived probability that international cartels will be detected, investigated, and 
convicted.  It is widely believed that the probability of detecting clandestine cartels is less 
than one-third. The degree of deterrence will also depend on the proportion of the price-
fixing overcharges awarded to plaintiffs in civil suits, which on average has been less than 
100% and in individual cases never exceeds double damages.  If these estimates are correct 
and conditions remain unchanged, permitting wholly foreign buyers to seek redress for 
antitrust injury in U.S. courts, will mean that typical would-be cartelists will face, if not an 
optimal level of deterrence, the likelihood of a much smaller degree of underdeterrence than 
exists today.  
